Presidential Use of Force in East Asia: American Constitutional Law and the U.S.-Japan Alliance by Waxman, Matthew C.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2020 
Presidential Use of Force in East Asia: American Constitutional 
Law and the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
Matthew C. Waxman 
Columbia Law School, mwaxman@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew C. Waxman, Presidential Use of Force in East Asia: American Constitutional Law and the U.S.-
Japan Alliance, STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE: PATHWAYS FOR BRIDGING LAW AND POLICY, NOBUHISA 
ISHIZUKA, MASAHIRO KUROSAKI & MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, EDS., 2020; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 
14-676 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2726 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
48     Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Presidential  
Use of  









Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3731859
Presidential Use of Force in East Asia     49
Introduction
The U.S. Constitution’s allocation of military authority has adapted over time to 
major shifts in American power and grand strategy. This paper explains, with a 
focus on U.S. military actions in East Asia and possible scenarios of special joint 
concern to the United States and Japan, that the president in practice wields 
tremendous power and discretion in using military force. Although formal, legal 
checks on the president’s use of force rarely come into play, Congress nevertheless 
retains some political power to influence presidential decision-making. The 
president’s powers are also constrained by interagency processes within the 
executive branch, and alliance relations often feed into those processes.
This paper is mostly focused on U.S. domestic law issues. It also touches, 
however, on a few key questions of international law, especially as they relate to 
presidential power to interpret international law and to possible crisis scenarios of 
current concern.
The Constitutional  
Framework
Drafted in the late 18th century, the U.S. Constitution divided responsibility for 
military affairs between Congress and the president, providing several checks on 
presidential uses of force. The Constitution vests “executive power” in the president 
and designates him “commander in chief ” of military forces. But it assigns to 
Congress responsibility for creating, maintaining, and funding those military 
forces, and gives Congress the power to “[d]eclare war.” The constitutional framers 
generally wanted to give the president unified, tactical control over military forces, 
but they wanted Congress to retain primary control over decisions to go to war. The 
framers were also sensitive to political opposition to large, standing military forces, 
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which many Americans associated at the time with repression and a proclivity 
toward war.
Even from the start, this division of constitutional authority left ambiguous 
whether and under what circumstances the president could unilaterally engage 
in military activities. Although early presidents were usually hesitant to use much 
military force without explicit congressional backing—particularly since standing 
U.S. military forces were small and the president therefore relied on Congress to 
provide continuing financial support for them—over time a practice accumulated 
of unilateral presidential deployments and limited uses of military force short of 
all-out war in the absence of legislative prohibitions. 
During the first half of the 19th century, for example, presidents 
authorized punitive raids and shows of military force in Sumatra and Pacific 
islands, typically to protect American commercial interests. In the 1850s, the 
president ordered Commodore Matthew Perry to lead a Navy squadron on a 
diplomatic mission, using a show of military force, to open trade and other 
relations with Japan. On several occasions during that decade, presidents sent 
small military forces to defend U.S. interests in China, and likewise in Korea 
during the decades that followed. In 1900, the president dispatched about 5,000 
troops to China, as part of a multinational expeditionary force responding to 
the “Boxer Rebellion.”1 Especially after the United States gained territories in 
Asia following the Spanish-American War—one of only five declared wars in 
American history, though many other military operations have been authorized 
by Congress—presidents frequently directed armed forces to intervene in that 
region to protect American interests. 
As Louis Henkin explains in his treatise of U.S. foreign relations law:
By repeated exercise without successful opposition, Presidents have 
established their authority to send troops abroad, probably beyond effective 
challenge, where Congress is silent, but the constitutional foundations and 
the constitutional limits of that authority remain in dispute.2
Nevertheless, through the first half of the 20th century, it was still widely agreed 
that, except in cases of repelling an attack against the United States, only Congress 
could take the nation to full-blown war (as opposed to much more limited uses of 
military force, even if they involved some combat).
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Post-World War II  
Presidential Powers
Several interrelated factors in the years immediately following World War II 
combined to dramatically increase the president’s power to use military force. 
These factors include more expansive constitutional theory regarding presidential 
powers, the formation of mutual defense treaties, and the establishment of a 
permanent, large-scale military force.
First, presidents during most of the Cold War asserted very broad 
prerogatives to use even relatively large-scale force without congressional 
authorization. Executive branch lawyers adopted an expansive view of presidential 
foreign relations and military powers, and Congress largely acquiesced. The Korean 
War, which was never expressly authorized by Congress but lasted more than three 
years and cost the lives of over 33,000 U.S. troops, stands out as a turning point. 
It marked the largest unilateral military action abroad by a president to date and 
was justified by vigorous and expansive executive branch claims of constitutional 
power.3 As Arthur Schlesinger describes the ascendancy of an “imperial presidency” 
at that time:
The menace of unexpected crisis hung over the world, demanding, it was 
supposed, the concentration within government of the means of instant 
decision and response. All this, reinforcing the intellectual doubt about 
democratic control of foreign relations, appeared to argue more strongly 
than ever for the centralization of foreign policy in the Presidency.4
Since the Korean War, successive presidential administrations have asserted  
that the president, by virtue of his power to manage foreign relations and his 
role as commander in chief, has broad authority to initiate military operations 
that he deems to be in the national interest. The Justice Department has 
acknowledged in recent years that some large-scale military operations might 
be of such size, intensity, and nature as to constitutionally require congressional 
authorization. This point could be important in legal debates about possible 
military action against North Korea, given the likely large magnitude of such 
action, but, as explained below, that legal threshold may not in practice be of 
much consequence.5
Second, the United States concluded a set of defense pacts around the world, 
including with allies in the Asia-Pacific region, and these alliances contributed 
to a growth of presidential powers. These pacts included the Philippines (1952), 
Australia and New Zealand (1952), the Republic of Korea (1954), the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (1954), the Republic of China (1955), and Japan (1960). 
In the Japan case, the security treaty provides that:
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3731859
52     Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own 
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger 
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such 
armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security.6
Defense pacts turned the traditional American aversion to “entangling alliances” 
on its head; whereas for most of its history, American strategic thinking rested on 
the idea that the alliances might draw the United States into unnecessary wars, 
post-war thinking rested on the idea that alliances were necessary to prevent wars 
that would engulf the United States. These defense pacts meant that presidents 
could, in effect, rely on a pre-commitment of public support for military action to 
defend these allies. Presidents also justified expansive unilateral power to use force 
on the need to preserve the credibility of American security guarantees. Bilateral 
and regional security treaties generally contain a provision specifying that 
mutual defense will take place in accordance with each party’s own constitutional 
processes. This allowed the executive and legislative branches to paper over 
differences about constitutional prerogatives during ratification, but in practice 
the executive branch has asserted authority to invoke these provisions unilaterally. 
In other words, whereas one might think of international law as a likely constraint 
on executive branch discretion to use force, presidents have repeatedly used 
multilateral or regional security agreements as a basis for defending broader 
executive power with regard to military force.7 As Mira Rapp-Hooper and I 
recently wrote:
Some of the president’s constitutional powers relevant to alliances—such as 
the power to direct military operations in war and to appoint ambassadors 
(subject to Senate confirmation)—have always been clear. Starting in the 
early Cold War, though, the centrality of alliances to U.S. foreign policy 
contributed to the vast accumulation of additional presidential powers—
some of them delegated by Congress and others established through 
executive branch practice over time. After nearly 70 years, presidential 
authority over U.S. security guarantees now appears to be almost entirely 
unilateral.8
A third major factor contributing to presidential powers to use force was that the 
United States maintained large, standing military forces after World War II, and 
the permanence of these forces diminished constraints on presidential power to 
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use them. Throughout most of its history, the United States had maintained very 
small or modest peacetime military forces. It mobilized wartime military forces to 
meet crises, and then it quickly demobilized them post war. With the advent of the 
Cold War, however, the United States never demobilized to the extent it had in the 
past. Large numbers of U.S. troops have for decades been stationed on bases in, for 
example, Japan and South Korea, in addition to a major U.S. naval presence in the 
Pacific at all times. Especially when combined with a nuclear arsenal, this large-
scale standing military power guarantees that a president, as commander in chief, 
has had permanently-ready forces at his disposal.
As a result of these and other factors, from the early Cold War onward the 
president has had wide latitude with regard to initiating force, and Congress has 
often played a reactive, sometimes even passive, role. For the purposes of this 
paper, one notable counter-example, in which the president showed significant 
deference to Congress, was President Dwight Eisenhower’s approach toward 
Taiwan (then Formosa) in 1955. In threatening to use force—possibly including 
nuclear weapons—to defend Nationalist China-controlled islands against 
aggression by Communist-China, Eisenhower sought and obtained explicit 
congressional approval to use whatever military means he deemed necessary. 
Even in seeking congressional approval, however, Eisenhower asserted that he 
had independent constitutional power to take some military measures anyway, 
and this case of seeking congressional approval for military intervention in 
advance stands out as more an exception than the norm.9 More typically, in the 
Vietnam War, for example, presidents slowly escalated U.S. military involvement 
before requesting and receiving very broad congressional authorization (in 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) to use military force to defend U.S. and allied 
interests in Southeast Asia. As public opposition to the war grew, Congress 
found it difficult to resist presidential requests for additional funds. Eventually, 
that opposition reached the point that Congress passed or threatened to pass 
legislative restrictions on the conduct of the war, pushing President Nixon to 
wind it down.10
Following the Vietnam War, Congress tried to adjust the balance of power 
among the political branches by enacting, over President Nixon’s veto, the 1973 
War Powers Resolution.11 Its stated purpose was to defend the constitutional 
framers’ original constitutional vision: that the “collective judgment of both the 
Congress and the president will apply to the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities 
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in 
hostilities or in such situations.” 12 The War Powers Resolution stipulates that if the 
president sends U.S. forces into combat, he must withdraw them within 60 days 
unless Congress declares war or expressly authorizes the president to use force. 
Over time that law has been watered down in several ways, however, and Congress 
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has not proven willing to enforce it strictly by further exercising its legislative 
powers. 13
In practice, the president thus has broad unilateral discretion to engage 
U.S. military forces in hostilities abroad. Examples in the Asia-Pacific region since 
the Vietnam War include action to retake the captured merchant vessel Mayaguez, 
deployments to the Philippines during the 1989 coup attempt, and contribution to 
UN efforts to restore peace in East Timor.
Although this paper has mostly focused on U.S. domestic law related to 
use of force, another quick note about international law is important here and 
relates directly to these observations about presidential power: the president has 
wide latitude, domestically, in interpreting international law constraints on force, 
such as self-defense, and the provisions of security treaties (though usually that 
interpretive power is delegated to subordinate officers and exercised through 
interagency processes). Moreover, and as explained further below, the United 
States has adopted broader interpretations than most states, including close 
allies like Japan, of self-defense rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter.14 These 
include a broader understanding of anticipatory self-defense (though its scope  
is still a matter of ongoing internal debate) and the view that any use of force—
even a small one—against the United States under Article 2(4) could also 
constitute an “armed attack” triggering self-defense rights. Interpreting these 
international legal constraints on force is left to the president, with Congress 
playing little if any formal role and courts regarding international legal issues  
of force as non-justiciable. 
It is, in sum, generally understood that from the Korean War onward, the 
president has exercised vast unilateral powers to use military force. The sheer scope 
of this presidential authority to use force obviously contrasts sharply with Japanese 
government decision-making about force. Moreover, whereas Japan’s approach is 
generally premised on clear lines of what is or is not permitted in advance, the U.S. 
approach is premised on the idea that security contingencies are unpredictable, 
and it is better therefore to vest the government with substantial discretion as new 
issues arise.
Politics, Process, and Diplomacy of  
Presidential Decisions to Use Force
In some ways, the standard account of a post-WWII imperial presidency often 
actually understates the president’s power. That is because the actual deployment 
of forces into hostile situations is only one way in which he can use force. More 
often, the president wields the threat of force to deter or coerce certain conduct by 
others. With regard to East Asia, for example, the credible threat of U.S. military 
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force is a significant element of U.S. strategy for deterring Chinese and North 
Korean aggression, as well as reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection, 
to avert a destabilizing arms race.15 This includes explicit or implicit threats of 
force in response to specific crises or contingencies, such as during diplomatic 
confrontations with North Korea, in addition to more routine displays of force, 
such as free navigation exercises in the South China Sea. As I have argued:
Decisions to go to war or to send military forces into hostilities are 
immensely and uniquely consequential, so it is no surprise that debates 
about constitutional war powers occupy so much attention. But one of the 
most common and important ways that the United States uses its military 
power is by threatening war or force—to coerce, to deter, to bargain, to 
reassure—and the constitutional dimensions of that activity have received 
almost no scrutiny or even theoretical investigation.16 
There are no formal legal checks on the president’s power to threaten force and, 
given the size of the standing U.S. military arsenal, that power to threaten force is 
immense. 
There are, however, significant political checks on the president’s discretion 
to use military force, and these checks also affect how the president wields threats 
of force. As Jack Goldsmith and I have argued: 
The United States has a long history of presidential military initiative borne 
of responsibility and opportunity, and congressional acquiescence borne 
of irresponsibility and collective action hurdles. This historical pattern of 
executive unilateralism has not meant that the president is unchecked. It 
has simply meant that the checks were political, not legal, and were imposed 
by the threat of congressional retaliation if the president’s initiatives go 
terribly wrong, and by the U.S. public through electoral accountability.17
In recent years there has been a wave of political science scholarship substantiating 
these checks.
Douglas Kriner, for example, argues that although there has been much 
literature devoted to claims of an imperial presidency, Congress exerts significant 
influence over the use of force. Congressional politics affect both the frequency with 
which presidents use force abroad and the probability with which they respond 
militarily to crises. There are many ways in which Congress influences presidential 
uses of force, and presidents anticipate congressional reactions, such as introduction 
of legislation to authorize or curtail a use of force; congressional oversight hearings; 
and public debate over military policymaking.18 Congressional action or inaction also 
sends signals about domestic resolve to foreign parties—including adversaries and 
allies—thereby affecting the president’s calculus regarding force.19
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In their study of congressional efforts to constrain presidential war powers 
during the post-World War II era, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse “discover 
considerable evidence that checks and balances, though diminished, persist.”20 
Although they concede the president’s unilateral powers are very substantial, they 
argue that, under certain conditions, the congressional checks are constraining. 
Moves by members of Congress to introduce bills, pass resolutions, hold hearings, 
and make public declarations can increase political costs for presidents, and 
even sometimes impose legal limits on force.21 Like Kriner, they also find that 
congressional opposition to military force reduces the president’s ability to signal 
resolve to allies and influence public opinion.22 
Besides congressional political checks, internal process within the U.S. 
executive branch exerts significant influence on presidential use of force. The same 
post-World War II period in which constitutional practice shifted toward unilateral 
presidential power also included the creation and institutionalization of formal 
interagency deliberative processes for national security and crisis decision-making. 
The 1947 National Security Act created the modern Department of Defense, 
Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council (NSC). Although the 
NSC has evolved, and the details of its composition and organization vary from 
presidential administration to administration, it helps structure deliberation on 
possible uses of force to ensure participation of key departments and agencies, as 
well as the president’s principal military advisers.23 
It is also through these interagency processes that the executive branch 
interprets international law in this area. The recently published Department of 
Defense Law of War manual describes the process this way:
Jus ad bellum issues might raise questions of national policy that, in the 
Executive Branch, would be decided by the President. In U.S. practice,  
legal advice provided to national-level principal officials on such issues 
generally would need to be addressed through interagency discussions 
coordinated by the legal adviser to the National Security Council, including 
consultation and coordination among senior counsel of relevant U.S. 
departments and agencies.24
Alliance relationships also influence presidential uses of force and are 
among the considerations that inform executive branch deliberations. On the one 
hand, a general approach to defense planning that emphasizes military primacy 
has meant that the United States has great flexibility in wielding its armed might.25 
Moreover, the U.S. executive branch can make decisions on the use of force more 
quickly and dexterously than can allies with more cumbersome approval processes 
or, as in the case of Japan, stricter restrictions on what military forces can or cannot 
be called upon to do. 
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On the other hand, coalition building and maintenance is often an 
important strategic and political concern, constraining U.S. military actions or 
threats of military force. Military-to-military ties mean that allies’ interests will 
also generally exert constant, even if sometimes subtle or indirect, influence on 
executive branch deliberations through the departments involved in maintaining 
and exercising those relationships. This is a ripe area for further research, especially 
with regard to how different alliance relationships and structures feed into U.S. 
decision-making processes, particularly during crises.
North Korea and Taiwan Strait Tensions 
Recent tensions and negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
development, as well as concerns about China’s ambitions toward Taiwan, help 
illustrate many of the issues discussed above. 
As to North Korea, although each of the previous three presidents has 
reportedly considered military strikes against North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, 
president Trump was initially, and prior to his summits with Kim Jong Un, 
much more open about the possibility of such action than his predecessors. 
Some members of Congress publicly questioned or pushed back against Trump’s 
bellicosity, including suggesting that he lacks constitutional authority to take 
actions without congressional authorization, but Congress as a body showed little 
willingness or capacity to apply more than informal and diffuse political pressure 
against a possible rush to war.26
As to the international law dimensions of the North Korea situation, the 
Trump administration has been publicly reticent.27 At a 2017 Senate hearing, the 
Secretaries of Defense and State confirmed under questioning that the United 
States lacked international legal authority to strike North Korea absent an 
“imminent threat,” but they declined to clarify how they interpreted that standard 
in the North Korea context.28 President Trump’s advisors had—again, prior to the 
presidential summit meetings between the American and North Korean leaders—
emphasized that the window is closing for action before North Korea develops the 
capability to attack the continental United States with nuclear weapons. It seems 
likely that the current U.S. administration interprets “imminence” significantly 
more broadly than its East-Asian allies, especially Japan.
Besides the prospect of actual military intervention abroad, the North Korea 
situation also illustrates related presidential powers for managing alliances that 
can have signaling effects. As commander in chief who can deploy forces abroad, 
the president can also withdraw them. President Trump has hinted at his interest 
in bringing U.S. troops home from South Korea, though Congress recently passed 
a statute limiting his ability to do so (and the constitutionality of that restriction 
is uncertain). The president can also cancel or downgrade military exercises, as 
President Trump has done with U.S.-South Korean military exercises as part of his 
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diplomacy toward the peninsula.29 
The Taiwan Strait is another hotspot that highlights the vast scope of 
presidential powers, and especially the wide latitude presidents have to engage in 
demonstrative shows of force. Ever since the United States normalized relations 
with China in the 1970s, Congress has generally taken a hard line in favor of 
defending Taiwan, so there has not been much political or legislative constraint 
from Congress on strong executive action. In 1995, for example, after China 
engaged in missile tests and other actions to intimidate Taiwan, President Clinton 
ordered additional naval forces to the Taiwan area and sent some of them through 
the Taiwan Strait. The Trump administration has also used naval deployments to 
reinforce and signal American commitments to prevent Chinese military actions 
against Taiwan (as well as China’s assertions of control in areas of the South 
China Sea). As with South Korean military exercises, displays of force like this 
can reassure and bolster defense of partners, but they can also provoke escalatory 
responses. Such moves are almost exclusively within the president’s discretion, at 
least in the absence of direct legislative restrictions to the contrary.
Conclusion
However the U.S. constitutional system was originally intended to constrain 
formally the president’s military authority, the modern president in practice 
wields tremendous power and discretion to initiate military operations. The 
system has adapted over time to major shifts in American power and grand 
strategy. Although formal, legal checks on the president’s use of force rarely 
come into play, Congress nevertheless retains some political power to influence 
presidential decision-making, and internal bureaucratic processes also constrain 
presidential action. Q
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